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Abstract 
 The Object formula („Objecktformel”) has been designed and developed in the mid 
century XX by Günter Dürig, starting from the second formula of Kant's categorical imperative. 
The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany took the formula and applied it for the first time in 
the case of the telephone conversations of December 15, 1970. The Object formula 
(„Objecktformel”) was taken from the German constitutional law and applied in the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. 
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Introduction 
The Object formula was designed and developed by Günter Dürig, is outlined based on a 
negative form, but gives some legal possibilities. The theory of the object starts from the second 
formula of Kantian categorical imperative: “act in your relationship with humanity, in relation to 
your own person and in relationship with others, as they would be for a purpose and not a simple 
way”. 
According to Dürig, the guarantee of the dignity is rooted in the idea that man is distinct 
from impersonal nature because of his mind that allows him to become self-aware, to self-
determination and to shape his own destiny. Therefore, to treat someone as an object is to deny 
his ability to self-determination and to shape the environment. According to Dürig, the human 
dignity is affected when a concrete human being is reduced to an object, to a simple way, to an 
amount that you can dispense. The violations of the human dignity involve the degradation of a 
person to a thing that can, entirely, be kept in short, to have him be registered, to be brainwashed, 
to be replaced, to be used and be expelled.  
This expression comes from the historical context of post-World War II and is now 
extensively applied to the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany. The idea was taken up by 
several German authors, with some nuances. The renowned German professor Josef Wintrich, 
which started from Kant's formula, stated that a person must remain “an end in itself in society 
and in the legal system can never be denigrated as a simple means of community, as a simple 
instrument or simple object without rights in system”1. 
 
 The application of the object theory in german constitutional law 
 
To reify means, according to Kant's philosophy, to use the person only as a means to 
another end. Treating a person as an object is a denial of the uniqueness of the individual. No 
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matter if reification is done by the state or by another individual as undermining human dignity 
is retained in both cases, it matters that the person can no longer trace the route of his own life, 
being completely available to another people. Humiliation, stigmatization, persecution, exile, 
inhuman or degrading punishment were considered in law as affecting human dignity. 
The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany took the theory of the object and explained 
for the first time the concept of „Objektformel” in the case of telephone tapping of December 15, 
1970. In this case it was about a constitutional amendment aimed at restricting the exercise of the 
right to privacy of correspondence, mail and telecommunications. It was indicated on this 
occasion that „Often it happens that a man is reduced to being an object of relationships and 
social development, but also to the law, meaning that he must obey without his interests being 
taken into account. It is not enough to retain a violation of human dignity. For this, you need that 
the treatment put in question the quality of the subject, or where it is the case, a violation of 
dignity that is arbitrary. The human treatment by the law enforcement public authorities should 
be a treatment that is contemptuous”2.  
The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany (Bundesverfassungsgericht) has frequently 
held that is contrary to human dignity when a person is considered as a mere object of state. The 
Court expressed doubt about the fact that a formula such as general as the formula of the object 
could determine whether there was a violation of dignity in a particular case, and this is one of 
the weaknesses of the formula. To be an infringement of human dignity, it was argued that in 
addition, the person must be subjected to a treatment that basically launches doubts about the 
quality of a subject or in a particular case proves arbitrary disregard for dignity. To violate 
human dignity, the individual treatment in the hands of the public authority must be the 
expression of contempt for the incumbent of every human being by virtue of being a person. The 
Federal Constitutional Court of Germany was concerned that if a person was not notified of the 
fact that his phones are tapped, the pressure imposed on the citizens by the state for the need to 
protect the society and the liberal democratic order, do not constitute the expression of contempt 
for the person whose privacy has been affected. It was also noted that the quality of compliance 
of the quality of a subject of the person, normally includes the right to apply to a court, but, the 
exclusion of the judicial routes in question was not motivated by contempt for the human person, 
as are offered other forms of judiciary control. Therefore, the Federal Constitutional Court of 
Germany has not removed from the “object” formula, but he attached a subjective conception: 
“Objeckt - Subjekt – Formel” (the formula considering as object or as subject). 
On the other hand, in the Microcensus case 3 , the Federal Constitutional Court of 
Germany established that to compel a person to record all aspects of his personality would treat 
it as an object. The dignity requires the state to treat the individual as being capable of self-
determination, and should be left an internal space for a free and responsible development of his 
personality.  
“Objecktformel” involves determining the obligations of abstention and not the content 
of human dignity, such a formula addressing the concept of human dignity analyzed for 
restriction4. The content of human dignity can’t be defined in a general manner. The definition is 
a made in a negative way, the German Constitutional Court stating that human dignity must 
always appreciated by a particular case, and the appreciation from this perspective remains 
conjectural. Therefore, the general expressions like “the human being must not be reduced to an 
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object in the hands of state power” can only sketch and can be found within the violations of 
human dignity”5. 
One of the most controversial cases in which the German Constitutional Court applies the 
theory of the object is the Case of the Aviation Security Act6. As a reaction to the terrorist 
attacks of 11 September 2001 on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, in Germany was 
adopted the Law of aviation security, in 2005. The Section no. 14 of the law has aroused various 
reactions, as authorized by the Minister of Defence, with the consent of the Minister of Interior 
to use military force against a passenger of the aerononave if the plane intended to be used 
against human life, and when it was the only way to avoid an imminent danger. 
Several lawyers and flight captains cited the non-compliance of the law with Art. 2 
paragraph (2) which guarantee to all persons the right to life, together with Art. 1 paragraph (1) 
on the inviolability of human dignity in the German Basic Law. They reasoned the position 
adopted by showing that in doing so the State relativize the human life of the passengers on 
board, treating them as objects of state action and depriving them of their human value and honor. 
The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany agreed with this position. In his view, to 
allow felling a passenger plane, the passengers and the crew would be deprived of the right to 
self-determination and thus would be mere objects of any rescue operation for the protection of 
others. Or, “human life is intrinsically connected with human dignity as the supreme principle of 
the Constitution and the highest constitutional value. Every human being is endowed with 
dignity as a person regardless of his physical or mental condition, (...), capacity or social status. 
No person may be deprived of his dignity. Any violation of this value would be unjust. The 
principle applies during the entire life of the person and includes the dignity even after death”7. 
The Court held that if the right to life may be restricted by law, the principle of human 
dignity prohibits absolutely intentional killing of helpless people, passengers on a plane. In 
addition, the legal authorization of this kind would violate the “essence” of the fundamental right 
to life and the assumption that passengers when boarding would consent to breaking aircraft is 
nothing but a “non-realistic fiction”8. The court noted that people should not be treated as objects 
for the purpose of saving others and the killing of innocent passengers can not be used as a 
means to save the lives of potential victims on the ground, because human life can not be 
available unilateral to the state in this way, even if there is a statutory authority. 
 
The application of the theory of the object in the jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights  
 
The European Court of Human Rights took the formula of the object and applied it in 
several of its decisions.  
The first is the case Tyrer9, in which the plaintiff Anthony Tyrer was a British citizen, 
living in Castletown, Isle of Man. As with the other three teens, seriously injured a student in his 
school at the age of 15, he was sentenced by a local court for youth to corporal punishment 
consisting of three strokes of rods, for unprovoked assault causing bodily harm. Since his appeal 
to the High Court of Justice of the Isle of Man has been dismissed, the conviction was executed 
on April 28, 1972, to the police station in the presence of his father and a doctor. This type of 
punishment, although they were abolished in England, Wales and Scotland in 1948 and in 
Northern Ireland in 1968, was held for certain crimes, in the legislation of the Isle of Man. They 
apply only to males aged between 10 and 21 years, the number of shots being up to 6 for a 
person aged up to 13 years and 12 for those aged between 13 and 21 years. These penalties were 
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  Beatrice Maurer, Le principe de respect de la dignité humaine et la Convention européenne des droits de 
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6
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7
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8
  Case on aviation security Act, cited above, § 157. 
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rarely applied, and in 1969 applied only to crimes of violence against persons. Before the 
Commission, the applicant complained under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights. Having established that the question is not about torture or inhuman treatment, because 
the suffering caused by Antony Tyrer involved did not reach these concepts, examined whether 
the corporal punishment was a degrading treatment. For the purpose of the Court, is degrading 
the punishment if provoked humiliation and contempt that reach a particular level, which differs 
from the usual element of humiliation that contained normal and almost inevitable in any 
corporal punishment. The Court noted that the assessment in this regard is relative, being taken 
into account, in particular, the nature of the punishment, the context of the punishment and 
manner of execution. Compared to all the circumstances of the case, decided that the corporal 
punishment is degrading. 
The reasons for the decision, is invoked the object theory. Judicial corporal punishment 
suppose, by their very nature as a human being to do the physical violence on his fellow man. He 
added as extra gravity that it was about institutionalized violence, and that those who applies 
penalty are complete strangers to the punished and to all involved formal punishment (anxiety of 
waiting for the violence to apply to them, and the shame of having to undress). It prohibited the 
use of punishment contrary to art. 3 of the Convention, whatever their deterrent effect. The 
European Court of Human Rights concluded that art. 3 of the Convention was violated because 
the penalty imposed on the applicant “consisting of being treated as an object of political power 
injured his dignity and physical integrity”10. 
It is worth recalling the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in P.E.T.A. 
Deutschland against Germany on November 8, 201211. In March 2004, the applicant Association 
P.E.T.A. (“People for the ethical treatment of animals”) is planning to start an advertising 
campaign titled “Holocaust on your plate”. The campaign, developed in a similar way to the 
U.S.A., consisted of a number of posters, each with a photo of prisoners in concentration camps 
with an image of the animals kept in farms for mass production, accompanied by a brief text. 
One of the posters exposing a photo of emaciated camp inmates, naked, next to a photo of 
starving cattle under “walking skeleton”. Another poster showed a picture of the human bodies 
stacked on top of each other with the title „Ultimate humiliation” and rows of prisoners lying in 
bed crowded with flocks of birds in battery hens under the title “Concerning animals, everyone 
becomes Nazi”. Another poster featured a male prisoner starved and naked with starving cattle, 
titled „Holocaust on your plate” and the text “Between 1928 and 1945, 12 million human beings 
were killed in the Holocaust. So many animals are killed every day in Europe for human 
consumption”. 
In March 2004, three individuals, P.S, C.K. and S.K., have submitted an application to 
the Regional Court of Berlin calling for the association to refrain from publishing or not to allow 
the publication of seven posters listed on the internet, in a public presentation or otherwise. The 
applicants were then chairman and two vice-chairmen of the German central Hebrew, Holocaust 
survivors when they were child, and C.K had lost his family in the Holocaust. They argued that 
the campaign was offensive and violate their human dignity and the personality rights of the 
deceased family members of C.K.  
The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany dismissed the constitutional complaint, 
saying that the interpretation of images of the civil courts was one coherent. Federal 
Constitutional Court's reasoning is interesting in several aspects. First, the Court expressed 
doubts that such a campaign violate the human dignity of any of the persons described or 
applicants, because „not deny to the Holocaust victims described their value, putting them on par 
with animals, the scope of the campaign has not been to demean, but to suggest that the 
sufference of the people described was equal to the sufference aplied to the animals”12. But 
consider that it is unnecessary to decide whether the campain violated the human dignity of 
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applicants since the contested decision contained sufficient evidence to justify the ban on 
publication, without reference to the violation of the human dignity of applicants and considered 
acceptable that the domestic courts based their decisions taking into account the fact that the 
Basic Law makes a distinction between, on the one hand, human life and human dignity and on 
the other hand, the interests of animal welfare and that the campaign trivialized the fate of 
Holocaust victims. The German Federal Constitutional Court held that it was acceptable that the 
content of the campaign violated the personality rights of the plaintiffs. According to Court “was 
part of the self-image of Jews living in Germany about the fact that they belonged to a group that 
was marked by fate and that a special moral obligation was owed by all others, who formed 
some of their dignity”13. 
On the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany have made several 
important clarifications. The principle of human dignity is central in the German legal system. 
According to art. 1 paragraph 1 of the German Basic Law, “Human dignity is inviolable. All 
public authorities have an obligation to respect and protect”. In German law, commitment to 
human dignity can be analyzed by the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany. On the other 
hand, this guarantee “was not open to any form of balancing test. It is the right which may 
“trump” over all other rights. (...) Being the first norm and unrevised, the human dignity was 
more than a norm and expressed the spirit of whole fundamental law in a nucleus”14. Human 
dignity acts as principle of interpretation, correcting any teleological interpretation of the 
German Basic Law which is not in the purpose of the respect of human dignity. In the 
relationship between freedom of expression and the right to honor, dignity is an impassable limit 
for the first. When it appears that expression of opinion violated the human dignity of the 
applicant, that decision does not depend on weighing competing interests. In the conflict between 
fundamental rights, the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany reviewed the observance of 
proportionality, particularly checking if Ordinary Courts have ignored the importance of freedom 
of expression as a fundamental right. Since it was found that freedom of expression was given 
due consideration by the Regional Court, the Federal Constitutional Court has not considered it 
necessary to refer the case to the lower courts for review because there were no indications that 
the latter would have reached to a different conclusion. In addition, the lower courts based their 
opinion on the fact that the campaign violated the applicants' human dignity as a violation of 
their personal honor was extremely serious. 
We must insist also on the different position stood by the Austrian Supreme Court. In 
March 2004, the same posters were exhibited in Vienna and a number of Austrian citizens of 
Hebrew origin, other than the plaintiffs in this case and Holocaust survivors have filed an 
application with the Austrian courts in order to prohibit the publication of seven posters. The 
Austrian Supreme Court dismissed on October 12, 2006, saying that the posters are not 
depreciating the inmates of concentration camps described, and, moreover, the court held that the 
poster campaign, except that it addresses an important topic interest, had a positive effect to 
revive the memory of national-socialist genocide.  
The European Court of Human Rights ruled that there was no violation of Art. 10 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. So deciding, the court considered whether the 
interference was necessary in a democratic society. 
First, it was stated that the association intended a campaign with posters about animal 
welfare and the environment, so in public interest, making that only strong reasons to justify the 
interference with freedom of expression of the association in this context. The Court held that 
domestic courts have held that the campaign did not pursue the purpose to humiliate inmates in 
concentration camps described as the images involved only that the suffering applied to human 
and animal was equal. 
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The Object theory provides arguments to ascertain the applicants’ personality rights 
violations. The “instrumentalization” of plaintiffs suffering was the one who infringe their 
personality rights as Hebrew who lived in Germany and the Holocaust survivors, the violation 
being compounded by the fact that the victims were shown in their most vulnerable state. 
The problem becomes even more interesting by the fact that the court believes that this 
can not be detached from the historical and social context in which the expression of opinion 
occurs. Therefore, in the opinion of the Court, referring to the Holocaust should be seen in the 
specific context of the German past and the government’s position that believe they have a 
special obligation to the Jews living in Germany, must be respected. Moreover, historical 
considerations, qualified as appropriate historical context, historical past, the particular historical 
circumstances, historical trend, historical experience, usually invoked by the respondent State to 
justify an interference with the exercise of the conventionality right guaranteed by the 
Convention are considered by the European Court regarding its control over the discretion of the 
state: they are one parameter among others to determine the extent of the discretion15. 
On those facts, the European Court of Human Rights leaves Member States a wide 
margin of discretion, stating that “other jurisdictions could address similar issues in a different 
way”16. There are still considered two factors: that have not been applied a criminal penalty, but 
a civil prohibition preventing the association to publish seven posters specified and that it was 
not demonstrated that the association had no other means available to attract the attention of the 
protection of animals.  
Judges Zupančič and Spielman rejects the arguments of the majority view of the fact that 
“the impact of an opinion (...) on someone else’s personality rights can not be detached from 
historical and social context in which the statement was made and that a reference to the 
Holocaust must also be seen in the specific context of the German past”17 . From such an 
argument, would clearly be inferred that the European Court would agree with the impunity 
behavior of the association concerned, if it comes to a jurisdiction where the historical and social 
context is different according to the statements. The central idea underlying the judgment in the 
separate opinion is the relativization of an unacceptable uses of freedom of expression. It was 
argued that one can imagine that the posters were made from the opposite point of view; 
situation where someone can reach to the contrary impression that prisoners who are shoulders 
barbed wire should be compared with pigs behind bars. The two judges sharply criticized the 
majority opinion, stating that: “If such is the kind of statement covered by freedom of expression, 
one then finds it difficult to understand, what is not covered by freedom of expression. (...)The 
above relativisation is deeply problematic from a seemingly “democratic” point of view, where 
everything goes because everything is relative and everything is, to put it metaphorically, for sale. 
People only have opinions, but they lack convictions, let alone the courage of their convictions. 
The difference between good and evil, between what is right and what is clearly wrong is thus a 
matter of opinion, as if reasonable men could reasonably differ on a particular subject matter. 
Here we may pause and ask, whether reasonable men could indeed or could not differ on the 
utterly distasteful and unacceptable comparison between pigs on the one hand and the inmates of 
Auschwitz or some other concentration camp, on the other hand. A few decades ago this kind of 
Denkexperiment, even in the American context, would only yield a result unfavourable to the 
applicants, because a few decades ago, reasonable persons could not possibly differ on the 
question we have before us in this case. (...) On the other hand, the unfortunate implication of 
our own position seems to be that the same kind of “freedom of expression” in the Austrian 
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cultural context would clearly be acceptable – let alone in other countries ranging from 
Azerbaijan in the east to Iceland in the west”18. 
The dissenting opinion focuses on the theory of the object. Contrary to the view 
expressed by the majority, in the dissenting opinion, the principle of dignity is first invoked and 
then developed. The German constitutional concept of dignity coincides with the Kantian 
categorical imperative (“human being must be treated as an end in itself” ). The unit - dignity of 
the person opposes to the instrumentalization of the person by split between its components19. 
The person should be seen as a whole, as completed, with whose body can’t be achieved through 
inhuman and degrading treatment that provoke a sense of humiliation, to mitigate the social 
value, of dissocialising. Applying the theory of the object, the Court held that it is about the 
human dignity, as a mark of distinction between man and the rest of the universe, who would be 
harmed when the human beings in their suffering and humiliation overall are compared to 
chickens and pigs to lower order to promote animal rights, for in this case “we are not in a 
position to argue that human beings viewed in the images are treated as an end in itself”20.  
What are the arguments for recognizing the inherent dignity of each person? And why 
should not treat people merely as means? Worth to render this way, George Kateb explains our 
uniqueness among other species, human dignity source: “The human species is really something 
special in that it has a uniqueness or distinctiveness valuable, laudable, it is distinguished from 
all other species uniqueness. It has a higher dignity than all other species, or qualitatively 
different from that of other species. His superior dignity is theoretically based on partial upper 
discontinuity of humanity with nature. Humanity is not only natural, while all other species are 
only natural”21. George Kateb believes that human dignity derives from the unique ability of 
humans to reason. 
The presence of human dignity in the decision reflects the emergence and maturing of the 
relationship between dignity and freedom of expression, the first limiting it to the latter. The 
decision brings new elements, drawing a negative definition of dignity by resorting to the theory 
of the object, taken from German law and applied in the conventional space. 
 
Conclusions 
 
There is no complete agreement on the utility of the theory of the object. The main 
drawback of this theory is that it very much appeals to intuition. Part of the doctrine considers 
that the theory of the object is hopelessly vague, indefinite and fails to provide a principled basis 
for judgment in a case22. It would be several actions that the other is treated as an object, and 
when, however, does not violate dignity. In German legal literature, some authors call it 
“Leerformel” (formula without substance) as it is applied only on unambiguous restraints23. 
Others cite Schopenhauer's criticism24 and referring to the decision on wiretapping, believes that 
the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany deem it an empty formula. Two arguments can be 
made against the theory of the object. First, is the fact that it is often inconclusive and the second 
argument is that the contemptuous treatment sets the bar too high, in that it presupposes the 
existence of an intention to devalue the human person. However, the damages to dignity are not 
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  H. Botha, Human dignity in comparative perspective, Stellenbosch Law Review, vol. 20/2009, p. 4. 
23
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just intentional, but also those resulting from action taken knowingly, with the best intentions 
and to achieve legitimate objectives. 
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